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The Government of the Zoolas. - It would almost
puzzle a DeLolme, or any of the ancient writers on
governments, to define that of the Zoolas; and I may
assert, without the least apprehension of its being
controverted, that it is indisputably the most
incomprehensible government with which any known
nation on the face of the earth is conversant. In
one part of this work I have, from not being able to
find anything approximating to it, artong the ancient
or modern states, designated it a Zoolacratical
government—an appellation to which, from its
inexplicability, I thought it entitled. Its
outline, however, may be said to be perfectly
simple—namely, despotic.
(Nathanial Isaacs, Travels and Adventure in Eastern
Africa, first published 1836, third edition, 1970,
p.295)
Introduction
In the run-up to South Africa's first democratic
elections in 1994 the South African and foreign press, and
indeed, the South African public airing their opinions on talk
shows and in the letters' pages of the newspapers, debated
hotly the prospects for "real" democracy in the country. The
same question occupied the political scientists. In a paper
on democracy and development in post-apartheid South Africa,
presented earlier this year to the Institute for Advanced
Social Research, Tom Lodge posed the question of how strong
democratic inclinations are amongst most South Africans.1
In attempting to answer this kind of question, the press,
the public and the professors alike tend to follow a strategy
of racial bifurcation, considering the extent of the
democratic heritage of white South Africans; and then going on
to'! consider, the claims of black South Africans to liberal and
democratic traditions. The main elements cited in discussions
about the democratic inclinations of whites include the claim
by some that under apartheid, democracy was wholly absent.
This assertion is countered by others who argue that within
the franchise limitations of apartheid, democratic principles
prevailed. Still others refer to the proud tradition of Boer
republicanism, while Afrikaner patriarchy, the exclusion of
white women voters until "1930, a strong statist tradition and
a dominant one-party system are some of the qualifications of
that republicanism that are noted. Lodge has argued those
liberal values upheld in white South Africa were not without
meaning for black South Africans, notably in the existence of
an independent judiciary (although obliged to apply racist
legislation), a privately owned press and the like.
Lodge looks at recent history of political organizations
like the African National Congress (ANC) to assess further
black South Africans' claim to liberal and democratic
traditions. In his discussion he considers factors such as
the existence of manipulative inner caucuses, the discipline
and autocracy that follows from operating from exile and from
participating in guerilla warfare. He concludes that "[t]he
ANC exiles returned home with a well-developed set of
authoritarian and bureaucratic reflexes". At home, Lodge
argues they encountered a different political culture, that of
unions and civic organizations with a higher degree of
representation, democracy and accountability. Even here
however, Lodge notes, politics was often partisan, and
intolerant.
Discussion of the democratic inclinations of black South
Africans frequently has recourse to stereotypes about the
precolonial past. In one way or another, the "barbarisp" of
precolonial Africa is offered by commentators outside Africa
as an explanation for what is identified as a continent-wide
anti-democratic tendency. Many black South Africans appeal
to a precolonial idyll—the communalism of the past and the
consultative practices of precolonial chiefs. In 1993 ANC
legal affairs expert Zola Skewyiya argued that "traditional"
institutions such as chiefship needed to be "cleans[ed]...of
all the undemocratic attributes that were imparted to it both
by colonialism and apartheid."2
In the conflict which erupted last year at the World
Trade Centre between chiefs and women over the potential
conflict in the constitutional Bill of Rights between the
equality clause (entrenching every person's right to equality
irrespective of gender) and the customary law clause
(entrenching customary law in terms of which chiefs argued for
the permanent minority of women), chiefs stressed the
assumption of responsibility for the protection and
guardianship of women by men, and defended the clause as
crucial in preventing the erosion of the foundations of
African culture.3 It is clear that chiefs' arguments against
democracy serve directly their interests, allowing them to
retain power and influence where they might otherwise lose it.
At the same time, many of the very people whose interests are
not directly served by such arguments, indeed, whose
situations are compromised by them, support at least the
principles behind these arguments. From whence does this
support come? What deep laid political "habits" and
dispositions does it draw on?4 If such habits are
identifiable, are they long-standing or "original" precolonial
ideas, as both Sweyiya and the chiefs suggest? Are they
remnants of such ideas: refurbished "invented traditions" of
the kind discussed by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger in
their influential study, The Invention of Tradition, used in
the construction of new political ideologies?
Current (progressive) political wisdom rejects the notion
that such ideas are pristine survivals from precolonial times,
and tends to dismiss them as invented traditions which serve
directly the interests of chiefs and men. The question
persists: why then do people who do not benefit from these
inventions accept traditions which must obviously be seen as
constructions and manipulations? Why do they believe them to
contain some kind of truth? What determines the material
3
selected for use in an invented tradition, and how did that
process of adaptation actually take place? What materials
were available, why were they available for adaptation, and
what were the limitations on their use?
This paper tries to recast the question of how deep South'
Africans' traditions of democracy are, firstly, by posing a
corollary question: what political traditions and concepts of
social order do people have? Secondly, the paper challenges
the bifurcation of the answer to this question into separate
black and white political traditions, precolonial and
colonial/apartheid. To do this, the paper begins to
investigate some of the history of such traditions, or deep
habits. It looks at the way in which a tradition's (or
elements of a tradition's) own past shapes its present.
Through a focus on a single case, that of the political •
heritage of the Shakan system—termed "Zoolacratical
government" by the contemporary observer Nathanial Isaacs, who
felt no word in English would serve—the paper considers the
question of to what extent it is a source of the political
habits and expectations that are ingrained in the minds of a
significant number of South Africans. The paper will argue
that appeals to the Shakan legacy are, above all else,
expressions of a desire and need for social order, where
social order is understood as the alternative to anarchy and
violence. The paper traces historically the appropriation of a
specific set of ideas about social order derived from the
precolonial Zulu state into Natal colonial discourse and
practice, and specifically into the Natal Native
Administration. It suggests that certain of these ideas,
reshaped and refurbished, were, in turn, incorporated into
aspects of apartheid thinking and practice, as well as into
the ideologies of resistance to apartheid. The paper suggests
that an understanding of the history of the values which
underpin these ideas of social order offers an important
perspective on contemporary popular conceptions of authority
and of rights, as well as contributing to discussion of
historical predispositions towards different political
outcomes. The argument presented in this paper suggests that
one of the reasons that supporters of Zuluist politics (i.e. a
politics which emphasizes the relevance of the Shakan legacy
and the discipline and power of its amabutho system in
contemporary circumstances) prefer its authoritarianism to the
freedoms of liberal democratic politics, is because they
perceive it to be a necessary and effective bulwark against
current conditions of violence and anarchy.
As South Africans in post-apartheid times seek to modify
political-practices to take cognizance of popular beliefs,
historical predispositions and the need to temper the hegemony
of western institutions, the pressure to seek models and
justifications in the precolonial past is likely to mount. In
discussions about political culture appeals to the precolonial
past abound, both in as a source of authority or legitimation
for proposals made today, or in the form of metaphors used to
discuss contemporary conditions.* The argument presented here
is that any attempt to reach back to find examples from
precolonial past must be qualified by a clear understanding of
the many and varied processes by which such ideas have been
transported into the present. The simplistic idea of a
precolonial "democracy" as distorted by colonialism
misunderstands both precolonial political relations as well as
the extent to which colonial Native Administration modelled
itself on precolonial ideas. It makes too radical a
separation between the precolonial and colonial.
Where much recent scholarship has shown how colonial
authorities imposed their own axioms and aesthetics on the
colonized, or expediently reshaped existing institutions in
terms of their own criteria, the argument here is that
indigenous institutions were, in certain instances, taken up
in their full cultural complexity to give shape and form to
colonialism. The paper challenges Sweyiya's formulation that
the colonial state sought first to destroy the ethos of
African society and the institutions epitomizing it, and that
when it failed to do so, it "resorted to the strategy of
moulding and tailoring these institutions in order to serve
objectives commensurate with its colonial mission".6
Shaka as Political Metaphor
Since the early to mid-1980s, the image of Shaka has been
extensively deployed as the central icon in Zuluist politics.
Inkatha established Shaka Day as the primary celebration in
its calendar, and Inkatha and later Inkatha Freedom Party
politicians frequently invoke the image of the first Zulu
king. Although he was the founding father of the Zulu
kingdom, and is celebrated for his role in creating the Zulu
nation, the choice of Shaka as central icon is not self-
explanatory. Amongst the many Zulu-speakers who have
historically been connected to the Zulu kingdom, Shaka is by
no means uniformly remembered in positive terms, either in the
past or today. The James Stuart Archive abounds with stories
collected around the turn of the century, and many of which
date back deep into the nineteenth century, of the brutality
and oppression of Shakan rule.' Likewise, in the 1980s, Zulu-
speakers continue to attest to the harshness of the reign, of
Shaka.* Indeed, the Zulu king's own praises make much of his
violence, remembering him as
Rager, son of Ndaba
Ferocious one of the Mbelebele brigade
Who raged among the large kraals
So that until dawn the huts were turned upside down'
While politicians like the IFP leader, Gatsha Buthelezi,
make much of Shaka's accommodation of the Port Natal traders
who were the first Europeans to have a sustained engagement
with the Zulu kingdom, they stress constantly the warrior
heritage of Zulu speakers as established by Shaka.10 This
heritage as invoked by Buthelezi and by other Zulu-speakers,
both supporters and not of the IFP, consists of a number of
elements, most notably discipline and social order.
Order and Chaos: "Zoolacraticism" and "Cannibalism".
By the time of Shaka's death in 1828, the Zulu kingdom
had come, in the area between Delagoa Bay and the Mzimkhulu
River, to represent the forces of social order, albeit a harsh
one. It was depicted by contemporary black commentators as a
centre of civilisation and efficient administration and was
opposed to the chaos and anarchy of surrounding areas over
which Shakan rule was not established, and in which
cannibalism was reputed to be rife.
The various institutions of the early Zulu state from
which this reputation for efficient administration and
security derived are now well-known and do not warrant
extended treatment here." Suffice to say the amabutho system
lay at the heart of a well-established state apparatus,
augmented by an efficient bureaucracy, and the strategic
placement of Shakan loyalists in regional positions of
authority. The state and social structure were hierarchically
organized, arid political power emanated from above. The
government used organs of state power—the bureaucracy, the
military and secret services—to repress dissent to its rule
and to promote its policies.
The primary elements of "Zoolacraticism", in the view of
Stuart's informants were the talented leadership of Shaka
himself in which patronage and the maintenance of discipline
were carefully balanced. Speaking to James Stuart in 1903,
Jantshi kaNongila, for example, held the view that Shaka was a
successful conqueror, rather than a ruthless killer. "As a
matter of fact", he commented, "Tshaka did not put to death
the kings and kinglets he defeated, if, when he proceeded
against them, they ran away and did not show fight. He made
them izinduna [officers]".12 Nevertheless, Jantshi did note
that Shaka frequently caused people to be put to death.13 He
related how Shaka fed people to the vultures, but linked such
acts to the maintenance of authority and discipline in the
Zulu kingdom. According to Jantshi, Shaka would cut off a
man's ears if he did not listen, i.e. obey, and he would pick
out anyone wounded in the back in battle and kill him for
being a coward, for running away." In Jantshi's account,
Shaka's successor, Dingane, was unfavourably compared to Shaka
as being venomous, treacherous and tyrannical, and less
accomplished.15 In the account given by Ndhlovu kaTimuni,
Shaka emerges as a leader of great ability, an innovator and a
hero in battle.1' In response to a query from Stuart
regarding Shaka's alleged atrocities, Ndhlovu commented,
"People were concocting stories about him".17 Shaka's enemies
and rebellious subjects, of course, had harsher opinions,"
but on balance, the subjects of the first Zulu king viewed the
Zulu state as highly regulated.
The Shakan system of government was thus strongly
authoritarian, with great emphasis placed on "law and order".
Command, obedience and order were deemed to be higher values
than freedom, dissent and opposition. Shaka's legitimacy was,
and is, understood to be founded, not on his birthright, but
on his success and his achievements, which, in turn depended
on his army, and its character as highly disciplined and
effective, able to guarantee law and order in violent times.
Shaka's capacity to offer protection is attested to in his
praises:
He who was a pile of rocks at Nkandla,
Which was a shelter for the elephants in bad weather,
Which sheltered Phungashe of the Buthelezi clan,
Which sheltered Zihlandlo of the Mkhize clan,
And the elephants ran away from the place.1'
The analyst of Shaka's praises, M.Z. Malaba, offers the
following gloss on these lines: "And shelter, it seems, is
found in the person of the ruler—only in subservience is
there hope for a measure of security, as opposed to mere
survival".20 These emphases found in the oral texts were
transferred into European written accounts of Zulu history in
a variety of ways, but most decisively, as we shall see later,
when the Natal Native Administration began to draw on Zulu
history for a model of domination and control.
That these were indeed violent times is well-attested
to.21 In fact, it is the only point agreed upon by the many
contenders in the current debates around the concept of the
mfecane." The mfecane stereotype has conventionally
attributed this violence and upheaval to disruptions caused by
the invasions of Zulu armies. It is seen as the consequence of
a series of wars and migrations set in motion by the explosive
expansion of the Zulu kingdom, which was credited with
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disrupting life over a wide area of south-east Africa. In his
recent doctoral thesis focusing on the area between the
Thukela and Mzimkhulu rivers in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, John Wright has shown how the concept of
the mfecane which portrays these upheavals as a product of the
violent expansion of the Shakan state is misplaced, for the
area south of the Thukela was not devastated by the Zulu, and
they were never able to occupy more than a very small part of
it. Wright argues that these ideas of Zulu devastation were
the product of Cape merchant interests and those of their
associates, seeking to encourage British colonization of the
area. The idea was subsequently taken up by missionaries who
used it as a justification for the need to bring
"civilization" to the widespread disorder, and by settlers
seeking to justify their land appropriations. As Wright puts .
it, "The notion that the African societies no longer had any
coherent existence was clearly convenient to their purpose"."
In my view Wright is quite correct to assert that the
mfecane stereotype inappropriately attributes the upheavals to
the Zulu, and he marshals considerable evidence to support his
argument. However, in claiming that it was in interests of the
merchants, missionaries and settlers to support the idea of
the Zulu devastations, he downplays the extent of the
upheavals and dislocation which did indeed prevail, and which
provided the real meat of their claims to be the bringers of
"civilisation". In the minds of contemporary African
inhabitants of the region, Natal was an area of massive
upheaval and social dislocation, and was contrasted to the
Zulu state." They saw Shaka's kingdom as the source of the
only available security and as a centre of "civilisation" and
order. Once the missionaries' and settlers' own centres of
"civilisation" and social order were established, it is not
surprising that Shaka and the Zulu kingdom on the colonial
periphery were, in turn, constructed as the savage, "cannibal"
other.
Despotic Shakan rule was, it seems, the price for social
order and security that many local inhabitants were prepared
to concede particularly in the face the anarchy which was
depicted as existing beyond the borders of the Zulu kingdom.
This anarchy was vividly represented as "cannibalism" and was
said to a phenomenon that was contemporaneous with the rise, of
the Zulu kingdom." Shaka, in sharp contrast to his
representation in the mfecane stereotype, enjoyed a reputation
for acting against the "cannibals".26 Shaka's appointee, Jobe
of the Sithole established the "Izituli-zikaMandala" and
"Izintaba" outpo.sts charged with the special task of guarding
against the "cannibals"," while the most notorious of all the
cannibals, Mahlapahlapha kaMnjoli, chief of the Ntuli section
of Bhele who lived on the Ndaka (Sundays) River, was finally
routed by Dingane^**"'
Accountjs'"'6f cannibalism have, in recent years, been
treated,'Wlth growing scepticism, as scholars have become
increasingly aware of how the preconceptions of early European
travellers in Africa fed into and shaped their.descriptions of
the societies which they encountered. But cannibalism was a
feature as much of nineteenth-century African consciousness.
The indigenous idea of buzimuzimu is often translated as
cannibalism but is glossed by African commentators as the
opposite of civilized." In suggesting that the idea of
"cannibalism" has roots in African thought I question the
perspective current that cannibalism was "an invention" of the
West as the quintessential symbol of savagery." I am not
however suggesting that anthrophagy was common in early
nineteenth-century Natal. I am arguing that the idea of
buzimuzimu was current, and that it was counterposed to the
idea of social order.
"Cannibalism" was understood to prevail on the
peripheries of the Zulu kingdom, particularly in the areas to
the south and the west of the Zulu kingdom.51 Amongst those
designated as "cannibals'! were sections of the amaDunge" and
the amaBele." "Cannibalism" was the major trope for the
representation of social disruption, a state of cattlelessness
and extreme, famine.3* "Cannibals" did not live in settlements,
but in the bush or in caves.15 They were bandits who would
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kill people and eat them and the produce of their gardens."
For fear of these marauders, "no-one used to travel alone",
proclaimed Stuart's informant, Jantshi." Not all those who
were dislocated were deemed to be cannibals; some were seen as
their victims, as refugees who were also prey to wild
animals." People designated as cannibals were also .
consciously used as "hitmen". When the Hlubi chief
Langalibalele was captured by "cannibals" it was reported that
they had been put up to it by a rival claimant to the Hlubi
succession. In this case the victim escaped and went on to
rule the Hlubi. Stragglers from amongst the "cannibals", and
other "orphans" then joined chief Langalibalele." Likewise,
those who fled from Shaka like the Chunu chief Macingwane,
"died from a wandering existence (from destitution)",
reputedly eaten by cannibals.40 To be with Shaka was to
secure within culture, within an ordered, albeit
"Zoolacratical", system. To be outside his ambit was to be in
nature, uncontrolled and "cannibal".
We should note however that Shaka, viewed from the
perspective of another contemporary centre of social order,
Moshoeshoe's Thaba Bosiu, became the cannibal "other". In
BaSotho texts Shaka was in turn depicted as the devourer. As
David Coplan has argued "Certainly, for Basotho, Shaka is a
symbolic foil for their own Bakoena aristocracy's efforts at
state formation; a darkness against which to appreciate
Moshoeshoe's light"."
In 1873, the installation of the new Zulu king, Cetshwayo
kaMpande, was presided over by Theophilus Shepstone, Secretary
for-Native Affairs in the neighbouring British colony of
Natal. While it is remarkable in itself that a colonial
administrator officiated in the coronation of the monarch of
an independent state, of even greater interest is the fact
that both Shepstone, and the Zulu councillors who invited him
to participate in the ceremony, understood that he did so "as
Chaka". Elsewhere, I have described the circumstances of the
coronation and have explained at length the logic behind both
parties in casting the Natal Secretary for Native Affairs in
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the role of Shaka. My central argument was that Shepstone
drew on existing African conceptions of sovereignty
articulated in the image of Shaka to establish a model for
colonial domination and native administration, and found in
that model a legitimation.for colonialism. Shepstone
recognized that to appropriate the image of Shaka was to
assume for British imperialism a despotic form of government,
but one which was justified as a bulwark against disorder and
social chaps>.a conception not at odds with British views of
their civilizing mission. This concern with order and
disorder underlay the extensive researches by Shepstone into
the reign of Shaka.
Shepstone and the researching of the Shakan past
When Shepstone became the Secretary for Native Affairs,
"Shaka" was, in Britain, the name of one among many relatively
little-known African chiefs. It was only with the Anglo-Zulu
war in 1879 that the Zulu achieved a special recognition in
the eyes of the British public. What was known about the
first Zulu king in the mid-nineteenth century was ambiguous:
the image of Shaka that prevailed in settler and missionary
literature was of the Zulu king as a cruel tyrant amongst his
own people, but as the one Zulu monarch who had been good to
early white visitors to his kingdom. In general, Shaka was at
once favourably compared to his successor Dingane, who had
been responsible for the death of the Boers at the battle of
Ncome River (known to the settlers as the battle of Blood
River), and caricatured as a monstrous despot.42
In September 1863, at the behest of the Lieutenant-
Governor of Natal, John Scott, Shepstone embarked on a project
to collect information on the historical grounds for African
land claims in Natal. In an excellent discussion of
Shepstone's research and his methods, John Wright concludes
that, while Shepstone consulted earlier written sources,
"...Shepstone's histories were the product mostly of the
testimony given him by his own informants."43 Wright
establishes that Shepstone conducted historical interviews
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with about fourteen informants, and used the data gleaned as
the bases for two documents which he drafted in 1863-4."
Shepstone's first document was a history of the Natal
"tribes", the other an account of the.rise of the Zulu power.
The first comprises short histories of ninety-three groups
resident in Natal before the reign of Shaka. Shepstone's
investigations gave him a picture somewhat different from the
settler stereotype which ascribed the wholesale devastation of
Natal to Shaka. As Wright, who is concerned to trace the
origins of the mfecane stereotype, puts it,
Shepstone's researches indicated to him that the
established notion of the tribes of Natal as
virtually all having been dispersed or annihilated
by Shaka's Zulu armies needed a certain degree of
modification. The testimony which he collected from
some of his informants suggested that many of the
tribes had been broken up, or at the very least
disturbed, not by the Zulu but by one of at least
four non-Zulu groups of 'refugees' from north of the
Thukela, and one from the Natal midlands.46
Thus, in Shepstone's document the extermination which occurred
was ascribed as much to the actions of "other tribes"46 as to
the Zulu. Natal was shown to have been devastated, and to
have become, in contrast to the Zulu kingdom, a uncultivated
wilderness where cannibalism was rife47 and "universal
anarchy" reigned.4* The set of oppositions with which
Shepstone built up his narrative were not those of "the
West"/"civilization" and "the Other"/"barbarism", but of the
Zulu kingdom/order and the rest, specifically Natal/chaos.
These particular oppositions, as we have already noted, can be
sourced directly to African oral texts of the nineteenth .
century.
The second document, "Historic Sketch of the Tribes
Anciently Inhabiting the Colony of Natal, as at present;
Bounded, and Zululand," was based on the evidence presented in
the first document and gave an account of the rise of the Zulu
power that focused on Shaka. Shaka's rule was described as
autocratic and "uncompromising",4* but, on the whole, the
narrative was concerned with Shaka's military successes and
the expansion of the Zulu kingdom. While it is true that
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these two documents were the main sources of the "devastation
hypothesis", it is worth noting that they were generally free
of the sensationalism that marked the accounts of. earlier
writers like Nathanial Isaacs and Robert Godlonton.50
Instances of despotism were not represented as wanton
savagery, but as linked to processes of rule:
The large tribes who had been the first to disturb
the Aboriginal inhabitants of Natal, in their
endeavours to pass through the country now known by
that name, to escape from Chaka, having been
overtaken and dispersed by Chaka's armies in their
new residences, and their chiefs mostly killed, now
found further flight useless, and the great body of
their population returned and became subjects to the
Zulu King, who distributed them among his head men
and chief officers, and incorporated the young men
into his army as soldiers..."
Thus, for Shepstone, the mfecane did not, as Jean Comaroff and
John Comaroff have argued for colonizers generally, "confirm
the savagery of Africa"," so much as offer a discourse for
the discussion of questions of the nature of effective
domination in an African setting. The "Historic Sketch" was
overwhelmingly a narrative about the establishment of Zulu
sovereignty arid the extension of Zulu control of new
territories and peoples.
While peoples were "overtaken and dispersed" and chiefs
"mostly killed", Shepstone's accounts are remarkable for the
extent to which they were net faithful to the stereotype of
Shaka present in much contemporary missionary and settler
literature. The two accounts certainly were Shepstone's
constructions, but the unusual concern which they manifest
with questions of sovereignty do not have a precedent in
previous settler histories. As a "native administrator"
Shepstone had more reason to be concerned with questions of
sovereignty than most of his fellow white Natalians. But, as
contemporary African narratives concerning Shaka from other
sources make clear, he was not simply seeing in the accounts
collected a possible reading that could be twisted to suit his
own purposes. African accounts of Shaka were themselves
fundamentally concerned with matters of sovereignty and the
nature of power and domination.55
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The "Historic Sketch" opened, not with a chronicle of
historical events, but a distinctly anthropological discussion
of the nature of African sovereignty and government before
Shaka. The account went on to focus on the political and
military changes brought about first by Dingiswayo, and later,
Shaka, culminating in a short review of the reign of Dingane.
Throughout, the central theme was a concern with how power was
wielded and order maintained in the Shakan kingdom. This was
the framework for all allusions to Shakan aggressiveness and
autocracy.
With the production of Shepstone's two documents in 1863-
4, the first glimmerings of a whole new way of discussing
Shaka began to enter colonial productions of Zulu history..
Although Shepstone's two documents were not published until
1888 and 1890, /they were influential in shaping colonial
thinking at the time of their preparation, and they
foreshadowed a more expansive exploration and enactment of the
connections between Shaka and the notion of sovereignty which
Shepstone was to engage in the coronation of Cetshwayo.
The new politics and world view pioneered in the campaign
against slavery placed colonial administrations under pressure
to find systems of administration free of direct coercion but
also capable of executing the colonial project. The . .
institution of wage labour was one option, and a number of
studies have examined this choice and its impact on colonized
societies, Shepstone resolved the dilemma posed in a different
way—through recourse to an African model of domination.
Essentially Shepstone found in Shaka a model of ruling the .
African population of Natal that allowed him to circumvent the
liberal principles of government increasingly entrenched in
Britain but prohibitively expensive to implement in the cash-
strapped Natal colony. In a way that was fundamentally at
odds "with prevailing notions of individual rights, but
justifiable as an indigenous system, and one which was locally
understood as the force of civilization that held chaos at
bay, Shepstone sought to make all members of a chiefdom
responsible for actions of individuals, including the chief,
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and vice versa." Shepstone understood punishment of the
innocent along with the guilty to be a feature of cheap
administration. Likewise, the system of forced labour, or
isibhalo, which was introduced into Natal, was problematic in
times of anti-slavery. Shepstone was able to justify all of
these aspects of his administration as features of Shakan
times and as appropriate to the government of ex-subjects of
Shaka.
The terms in which Shepstone described Shaka's
administrative problems, mirrored almost exactly Shepstone's
own position,
The policy of Chaka saw his peculiar position as
despotic ruler of a people composed almost wholly of
conquered tribes, compelled him to mass them as much
as possible around him, to intermingle them as much
as possible, and so rule them as to destroy their
old associations and hence he would not permit the
occupation of the entire country he conquered."
My reading of Shepstone's treatment of Shaka is very different
from that of Daphna Golan, who talks about Shepstone "de-
emphasizing Shaka", and fighting "to break the dominance of
Shaka's heirs, the royal family in Zululand".6'' Shepstone
did, at a much later point, work with the colonial authorities
in trying to rein in Zulu royal power, but, in principle, he
held an opposite position to theirs, namely, that a strong
central power modeled on the Shakan regime was essential to
the control of the Zulu kingdom, and the African population of
Natal. This underlay an almost obsessive interest on
Shepstone's part in the reign of Shaka."
When Shepstone was offered the opportunity "as Chaka" to
install Cetshwayo, he understood it in terms very different
from that of playing the part of a "savage monster". Rather,
he perceived that the invitation offered him the possibility
of intervening directly in matters of Zulu sovereignty. It
was, Shepstone recognized, an opportunity loaded with
possibilities. To recognize the possibilities and to explore
them required a grasp of the cultural logic of the African
population of Natal and the Zulu kingdom, and the role therein
of Shaka. This, it seems, Shepstone had, by 1873, achieved in
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substantial measure. . .
Following the Anglo-Zulu War, Shepstone's ideas came
under increasing pressure as settler interests began to
dominate Natal politics. A struggle developed within the
Native Administration between proponents of Shepstone's ideas-
-men like James Stuart—and officials who sought to implement
a more expedient form of indirect rule designed primarily to
service settler land and labour needs." In his 1911
publication on the 1906 Barabatha rebellion Stuart criticized
latter-day developments within "native policy" as attempts to
impose "Western Civilization" on Africans, and he depicted the
Bambatha affair as standing for a deep-seated rejection of
precisely that. Stuart made wide ranging proposals for the
form to be assumed by the new Union Native Administration,
proposals that were strictly in the mould of Shepstone's
ideas. To be effective, he argued, "native policy" had to
involve
a restriction of liberty as well as of
individualism. People by self choice, would tend
more and more to submit themselves to a form of
social and political life to which they were
accustomed and which, so to speak, runs in their
veins. They would therefore, elect to'be under a
form of control, provided this were exercised by
themselves, in the same way that we find Ethiopians
desirous of controlling themselves apart from all
European interference."
The seeds of a policy of segregation planted in this approach
are evident. But Stuart would have objected strongly to
segregation because of the policy's failure to maintain the
essences of the Shakan system, most notably its discipline and
its ability to guarantee social order and security. In terms
of the new Union constitution, the head of the government was
also the Supreme Chief of all the African inhabitants of South
Africa. In Stuart's eyes this was a perversion of the
Shepstone system and destined to fail'. This Supreme Chief was
distant, unknown and inaccessible, and, in turn, did not have
the necessary knowledge of the African communities under hime
to rule in the Shepstone—or Shakan—manner.
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Conclusion
The conception of a strong central authority as a bulwark
against chaos was thus an idea which characterized the reign
of Shaka, and one which was not obliterated but rather
reinforced by colonial practices in the nineteenth century.
In a distorted form this idea was incorporated into the
policies of segregation and apartheid, in the twentieth
century, much Zuluist politics has sought to challenge, these
distortions through acclaim to the "real" version, this time
as a bulwark against the chaos and social upheaval wrought
under apartheid. The invocation of these ideas in the
politics of the 1980s and 1990s as a powerful counter to the
ANC's programme for democracy is thus not a reclamation of
precolonial ideas, nor is it an expedient invented tradition,
but rather an appeal to concepts with their own long history.
The paper suggests that the potency of the symbol of
Shaka in South Africa today is neither the consequence of how
great Shaka really was, nor is it the result simply of clever
manipulations in the present by Zulu nationalists. It is the
product of the historical association within it of indigenous
conceptions of sovereignty and practices of colonial
domination. When journalist Barry Renfrew sought to capture
the ideas of discipline associated with Shaka in his
description of a Zulu rally: "The discipline is extraordinary.
I heard three thousand of them breathing together. It sounds
like the purring of a giant cat",60 he was invoking an image
with its roots in indigenous ideas, reinterpreted by the Natal
Secretary for Native Affairs, Theophilus Shepstone as the
basis for native administration, reinforced by. the Zulu
victory at Isandlwana in 1879, rehearsed in the many arguments
of James Stuart and explored in current Zuluist politics as
well as in texts such as the television series Shaka Zulu, and
the holiday resort, Shakaland. In the historically developed
discourses on Shaka, however, the corollary of the image of
discipline is violence and domination. Both notions have been
invoked in abundant measure in the 1980s and 1990s.
Precolonial "traditions" have typically been called upon
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by those whose political agenda is to find justifications for
their opposition to democracy. To characterize these
"traditions" as colonial inventions has been the favoured
response to such tactics. To engage seriously the question of
the possibility of the existence of deep habits and
dispositions is thus both unfashionable and risky. But not to
do so is to avoid tackling the tricky question of why it is
people whose own direct interests are not served by the
invocation of precolonial "traditions" respond positively to
them. This paper, necessarily incomplete—for this is far
larger and more nuanced a subject than any single paper can
accommodate—has tried to begin to chart an approach to the
question.
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